负债超8亿曾是SHEIN最大对手 “网红”跨境电商巨头破产

作者：杨洁文章来源：天下网商

2026-11-09 09:55

作者：杨洁文章来源：天下网商

2026-11-09 09:55

邦小白快读

全文速览

总1：先看关键事实。

1. 2026年9月1日希音在港交所挂牌，市值约2000亿港元，首日破发；四十多天后，跨境通公告深圳飒芙被宣告破产，截至2025年9月底资产不足7850万元、负债8.13亿元、净资产负7.35亿元。

2. ZAFUL曾是最紧追赶者：泳装切入欧美快时尚，近10万海外网红，日上新50至100款；2019年月活2300万、月均访问1.66亿次、90天复购率42%，在BrandZ中国全球化品牌榜单线上快时尚第二。

总2：再看失败链条与启示。

1. 2020年泳装需求受冲击，复购率降至8.55%，转化率仅0.69%；买断备货遇资金紧张后库存反噬，与工厂弱绑定；母公司环球易购海量铺货、占用供应商账期，2020年跨境通归母净亏损33.74亿元，拆分飒芙未救。

2. 底层问题是流量没有变成资产；行业进入精耕期，低价铺货旧模式出清，利润和现金流成为硬门槛。

总1：ZAFUL起量靠品牌营销与渠道组合。

1. 泳装切口视觉冲击强，签约近10万海外网红覆盖18至24岁人群；高校品牌大使、本地学生社群、音乐节时装周、社区晒单穿搭，把广告流量沉淀为私域。

2. 独立站日上新50至100款、设计到上架一两周，用低价快翻新形成声量；2019年月活2300万、月均访问1.66亿次、90天复购率42%，品牌一度逼近希音。

总2：品牌教训与消费趋势。

1. 品类单一在2020年泳装停摆时复购降至8.55%、转化率0.69%；流量未资产化，买断备货遇资金紧库存反噬，与工厂弱绑定。

2. 希音靠宽品类、小单快返数据系统拉开差距；平台转向品牌孵化、本地履约和关税合规，速卖通品牌GMV增90%、品牌成交渗透近40%、欧盟市场增97%；赛维时代亚马逊占80.24%、自营不到3%，安克创新全渠道，渠道跟消费者走，精力放产品和品牌。低价只能赢首次点击，稳定履约和确定体验才能留用户。

总1：政策与市场变化要先看清。

1. 2025年中国跨境电商进出口2.84万亿元、同比增4.8%，盘子扩大但增速从两位数回落，行业进入精耕期；小额包裹免税政策收紧，关税红利消退，合规门槛抬高。

2. 流量入口迁移，Temu靠平台补贴快速起量，TikTok Shop把短视频和直播成交逻辑带进欧美，速卖通押向品牌出海。

总2：风险、机会与可学习点。

1. ZAFUL复购率从42%降至8.55%、转化率0.69%，最终负债8.13亿元破产；风险在流量未资产化、买断备货、海量铺货占账期、供应商信用受影响。

2. 机会在平台品牌孵化、本地履约和关税合规基础设施，速卖通品牌GMV增90%、欧盟增97%，小米、泡泡玛特、追觅入驻；赛维时代亚马逊占80.24%、安克创新全渠道，渠道跟消费者走；下半场利润和现金流决定能坐多久。

总1：生产与设计需求在变快。

1. ZAFUL日上新50至100款，设计到上架只需一两周，用低价和不断翻新款吸引欧美年轻女性；但它与工厂多是买手挑款、工厂代工、贴牌上架，属于买卖关系，缺乏深度绑定和数据回流。

2. 这种快翻新能铺规模，一旦资金紧张，买断式备货压在仓库里的库存就会反噬，供应链迅速僵化。

总2：商业机会与数字化启示。

1. 希音坚持小单快返，用数据捕捉潮流趋势，把成千上万中小工厂接入系统，单款先小批量试产，卖得好再快速返单，把库存风险压到最低。

2. ZAFUL采用小单快返加买断备货，资金充裕时可快速铺规模，资金紧张时库存反噬；行业合规门槛抬高，平台把履约和合规做成标配，工厂更需要数据回流、深度绑定和稳定履约能力。

总1：行业趋势与客户痛点清楚。

1. 2025年中国跨境电商进出口2.84万亿元、同比增4.8%，增速回落，行业从跑马圈地进入精耕期；小额包裹免税收紧，关税红利消退，合规门槛抬高。

2. 独立站要自己扛流量、物流、退货和关税，ZAFUL流量转化率仅0.69%、复购率降至8.55%，最终负债8.13亿元破产，说明低价铺货旧模式正在出清。

总2：解决方案与机会在平台化和供应链。

1. 平台把品牌孵化、本地履约、关税合规打包成通用基础设施；Temu用补贴起量，TikTok Shop带直播成交，速卖通转向品牌出海，品牌GMV增90%、欧盟增97%。

2. 希音小单快返和工厂数据系统是供应链数字化样本；服务商可围绕数据回流、库存风险、工厂深度绑定、履约退货合规和品牌孵化做方案，稳健企业则让渠道跟消费者走，把精力放在产品和品牌。

总1：平台需求与最新做法明确。

1. 流量入口迁移，Temu用平台补贴快速起量，TikTok Shop把短视频和直播成交逻辑带进欧美，速卖通把重心押向品牌出海。

2. 速卖通618品牌GMV同比增90%、品牌成交渗透近40%，8月大促欧盟市场品牌逆势增97%；小米、泡泡玛特、追觅等入驻，平台从卖货渠道转向品牌孵化、本地履约和关税合规基础设施。

总2：运营招商与风向规避。

1. 行业承认低价能赢得第一次点击，稳定履约和确定体验才能留住用户；独立站自扛流量物流退货关税，平台把能力打包成通用能力。

2. 各国小额包裹免税政策收紧后，较量转向供应链、履约和服务；招商可抓品牌孵化、合规履约，运营要避开低价铺货旧模式出清风险，并重视利润和现金流。

总1：产业新动向与新问题。

1. 独立站黄金年代转向精耕期，2025年中国跨境电商进出口2.84万亿元、同比增4.8%，增速从两位数回落；ZAFUL从2019年月活2300万、月均访问1.66亿次、复购率42%，滑到2021年复购率8.55%、转化率0.69%，最终破产负债8.13亿元。

2. 失败机制包括流量未资产化、买断备货、供应商账期、母公司环球易购资金链断裂，以及拆分飒芙后商业信用受影响。

总2：商业模式与政策启示。

1. 希音小单快返加数据系统，对比ZAFUL与工厂弱绑定；平台化品牌孵化、本地履约、关税合规成为新基础设施；速卖通品牌GMV增90%、欧盟增97%。

2. 赛维时代亚马逊占80.24%、自营不到3%，安克创新全渠道并行，说明渠道可跟消费者走；小额包裹免税收紧、合规成本抬高，低价铺货出清，利润、现金流、产品和品牌更关键。

声明：快读内容全程由AI生成，请注意甄别信息。如您发现问题，请发送邮件至 run@ebrun.com 。

我是品牌商卖家工厂服务商平台商研究者帮我再读一遍。

Quick Summary

Summary 1: Start with the key facts.

1. SHEIN listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on September 1, 2026, with a market value of about HK$200 billion; it fell below its issue price on the first day. More than 40 days later, Kuajingtong announced that Shenzhen Safu had been declared bankrupt. As of the end of September 2025, its assets were less than RMB78.5 million, liabilities were RMB813 million, and net assets were negative RMB735 million.

2. ZAFUL was once the closest challenger: it entered Western fast fashion through swimwear, worked with nearly 100,000 overseas influencers, and launched 50 to 100 new styles daily. In 2019, it had 23 million monthly active users, 166 million average monthly visits, and a 90-day repurchase rate of 42%; it ranked second among online fast-fashion brands on the BrandZ China Global Brands list.

Summary 2: The failure chain and lessons.

1. In 2020, swimwear demand was hit; the repurchase rate fell to 8.55% and conversion was only 0.69%. Buyout stockpiling collided with funding shortages, and inventory became a burden; ties with factories were weak. Parent Globalegrow relied on massive product distribution and occupied supplier payment terms. In 2020, Kuajingtong's net loss attributable to shareholders was RMB3.374 billion, and spinning off Safu did not save it.

2. The underlying problem was that traffic did not become an asset. As the industry entered a period of intensive operations, the old low-price, broad-distribution model was cleared out, and profit and cash flow became hard thresholds.

Summary 1: ZAFUL scaled through brand marketing and a channel mix.

1. Swimwear gave it a visually striking entry point. It signed nearly 100,000 overseas influencers reaching the 18-24 age group, and used university brand ambassadors, local student communities, music festivals and fashion weeks, and community outfit posts to turn paid traffic into owned audiences.

2. Its DTC site launched 50-100 new styles daily, with design-to-listing in one to two weeks, building visibility through low prices and rapid refresh. In 2019, it had 23 million MAU, 166 million average monthly visits, and a 42% 90-day repurchase rate, briefly closing in on SHEIN.

Summary 2: Brand lessons and consumer trends.

1. With a narrow category, when swimwear stalled in 2020, repurchase fell to 8.55% and conversion to 0.69%. Traffic was not assetized; buyout stockpiling ran into funding pressure, inventory backfired, and factory ties were weak.

2. SHEIN pulled ahead through broad categories and a small-batch, quick-replenishment data system. AliExpress shifted toward brand incubation, local fulfillment, and tariff compliance: brand GMV grew 90%, brand transaction penetration reached nearly 40%, and its EU market grew 97%. Sailvan Times generated 80.24% of sales from Amazon and less than 3% from self-operated channels. Anker Innovations is omnichannel; channels should follow consumers, while energy is focused on products and brands. Low prices can win only the first click; stable fulfillment and consistent experience retain users.

Summary 1: Policy and market shifts must be read first.

1. In 2025, China's cross-border e-commerce imports and exports reached RMB2.84 trillion, up 4.8% year on year. The market expanded, but growth fell back from double digits and the industry entered a period of intensive operations. The small-parcel tax exemption tightened, tariff benefits faded, and compliance thresholds rose.

2. Traffic gateways shifted. Temu scaled rapidly through platform subsidies; TikTok Shop brought short-video and livestream transaction logic into Europe and the US; AliExpress bet on brands going global.

Summary 2: Risks, opportunities, and lessons.

1. ZAFUL's repurchase rate fell from 42% to 8.55%, conversion was 0.69%, and it ultimately went bankrupt with RMB813 million in liabilities. Risks lay in traffic not becoming assets, buyout stockpiling, massive distribution occupying payment terms, and damage to supplier credit.

2. Opportunities lie in platform brand incubation, local fulfillment, and tariff-compliance infrastructure. AliExpress brand GMV grew 90% and its EU market grew 97%; Xiaomi, Pop Mart, and Dreame joined. Sailvan Times derived 80.24% from Amazon and less than 3% from its own channels; Anker Innovations is omnichannel. Channels follow consumers; in the second half, profit and cash flow determine how long players can stay in the game.

Summary 1: Production and design demands are speeding up.

1. ZAFUL launched 50-100 new styles daily and moved from design to listing in just one to two weeks, using low prices and constant refreshes to attract young Western women. But its factory relationships were mostly buyers selecting styles, factories doing contract manufacturing, and private-label listing—a transactional relationship lacking deep binding and data feedback.

2. This rapid refresh could build scale, but once funding tightened, buyout-style stockpiling left inventory stuck in warehouses and backfired, quickly making the supply chain rigid.

Summary 2: Business opportunities and digital lessons.

1. SHEIN stuck with small-batch, quick-replenishment production, using data to capture trends and connecting thousands of small and mid-sized factories to its system. It first trial-produces each style in small batches and rapidly reorders winners, minimizing inventory risk.

2. ZAFUL combined small-batch quick replenishment with buyout stockpiling: with ample funding, it could scale quickly; with tight funding, inventory backfired. As industry compliance thresholds rise and platforms make fulfillment and compliance standard offerings, factories need data feedback, deeper binding, and stable fulfillment capabilities.

Summary 1: Industry trends and client pain points are clear.

1. In 2025, China's cross-border e-commerce imports and exports reached RMB2.84 trillion, up 4.8% year on year. Growth slowed, and the industry moved from land-grab expansion into intensive operations. The small-parcel tax exemption tightened, tariff benefits faded, and compliance thresholds rose.

2. DTC sites must bear traffic, logistics, returns, and tariffs themselves. ZAFUL's conversion was only 0.69% and its repurchase rate fell to 8.55%, ending in bankruptcy with RMB813 million in liabilities. This shows the old low-price, broad-distribution model is being cleared out.

Summary 2: Solutions and opportunities lie in platformization and supply chains.

1. Platforms are packaging brand incubation, local fulfillment, and tariff compliance into common infrastructure. Temu scaled through subsidies; TikTok Shop brought livestream transactions; AliExpress shifted toward brand globalization, with brand GMV up 90% and its EU market up 97%.

2. SHEIN's small-batch quick replenishment and factory data system are supply-chain digitalization models. Service providers can build solutions around data feedback, inventory risk, deep factory binding, fulfillment and returns compliance, and brand incubation. More resilient companies let channels follow consumers and focus energy on products and brands.

Summary 1: Platform demand and latest practices are clear.

1. Traffic gateways are shifting. Temu scaled quickly through platform subsidies; TikTok Shop brought short-video and livestream transaction logic into Europe and the US; AliExpress shifted its focus toward brands going global.

2. During its 618 promotion, AliExpress brand GMV rose 90% year on year and brand transaction penetration reached nearly 40%. In its August campaign, brand sales in the EU market grew 97% despite headwinds. Xiaomi, Pop Mart, Dreame, and others joined, and the platform is moving from a sales channel to infrastructure for brand incubation, local fulfillment, and tariff compliance.

Summary 2: Operations, merchant recruitment, and trend avoidance.

1. The industry recognizes that low prices can win the first click, but stable fulfillment and consistent experience are what retain users. DTC sites bear traffic, logistics, returns, and tariffs themselves, while platforms package these capabilities into common infrastructure.

2. As small-parcel tax exemptions tighten across countries, competition shifts to supply chains, fulfillment, and service. Merchant recruitment can focus on brand incubation and compliant fulfillment; operations should avoid the clearing-out risk of the old low-price distribution model and pay attention to profit and cash flow.

Summary 1: New industry developments and new problems.

1. The golden era of DTC sites gave way to intensive operations. In 2025, China's cross-border e-commerce imports and exports reached RMB2.84 trillion, up 4.8% year on year, with growth falling from double digits. ZAFUL went from 23 million MAU, 166 million average monthly visits, and a 42% repurchase rate in 2019 to an 8.55% repurchase rate and 0.69% conversion in 2021, eventually going bankrupt with RMB813 million in liabilities.

2. The failure mechanism included traffic not becoming assets, buyout stockpiling, supplier payment terms, the funding-chain break at parent Globalegrow, and damage to commercial credit after Safu was spun off.

Summary 2: Business models and policy implications.

1. SHEIN's small-batch quick replenishment and data system contrast with ZAFUL's weak factory ties. Platform-based brand incubation, local fulfillment, and tariff compliance are becoming new infrastructure; AliExpress brand GMV grew 90% and its EU market grew 97%.

2. Sailvan Times derived 80.24% from Amazon and less than 3% from its own channels, while Anker Innovations runs multiple channels in parallel, showing that channels can follow consumers. As small-parcel tax exemptions tighten and compliance costs rise, low-price distribution is being cleared out; profit, cash flow, products, and brands are more critical.

Disclaimer: The "Quick Summary" content is entirely generated by AI. Please exercise discretion when interpreting the information. For issues or corrections, please email run@ebrun.com .

I am a Brand Seller Factory Service Provider Marketplace Seller Researcher Read it again.

流量狩猎的时代正在收尾，曾经的“出海双骄”只剩下一个。

2026年9月1日，希音（SHEIN）在港交所挂牌，成为年内港股规模最大的时尚品牌IPO。即便上市首日即破发，这家公司依然以约2000亿港元的市值，站在了全球快时尚行业的中央。

四十多天后，10月15日，一则消息引起了人们的关注，跨境通宝电子商务股份有限公司公告称，近日收到从深圳前海合作区人民法院发出的破产裁定书，原全资下属公司深圳飒芙商业有限公司被宣告破产。截至2025年9月底，这家公司账面资产不足7850万元，负债高达8.13亿元，净资产为负7.35亿元。

飒芙的名字在公众视野里并不响亮，但七八年前，飒芙曾参与经营的ZAFUL，是SHEIN最紧的追赶者，它从泳装切进欧美快时尚，靠近十万名海外网红铺开声量，每天保持50至100款上新。2019年，它拥有2300万月活用户，月均访问量1.66亿次，90天复购率42%，在BrandZ中国全球化品牌榜单上位列线上快时尚第二，仅次于希音。

那一年，两个品牌你追我赶，差距远没有后来看上去那么不可逾越。

两家公司同样从中国供应链出发，同样靠低价和社交媒体敲开欧美年轻女性的衣橱，十余年后却分处两端。ZAFUL凭什么快速起量，又为何把一手好牌打到破产？

如今行业总量仍在扩容，可随着关税红利消退、合规门槛一步步抬高，低价铺货的旧模式正在加速出清，稳定盈利与现金流，却早已成了更硬的门槛。在这场分化与加速洗牌之中，玩家们各自走向了哪里？

从泳装品类切入，近十万网红托举出快时尚“黑马”

要拆解ZAFUL快速起量的秘诀，得先把时间拨回它诞生之前。这个品牌的供应链、运营资源和整套打法，都源自一家更早的公司——徐佳东在深圳创办的环球易购。

徐佳东是跨境电商行业早期的高学历创业者之一。他毕业于北京大学数学系，后赴美攻读数学博士。留学期间，他注意到中国制造与海外终端售价之间的巨大价差，萌生了把中国商品直接卖给海外消费者的念头。

2007年，他在深圳创立了环球易购的前身，自建英文网站，从华强北拿货，盯紧eBay上的热销数据，什么好卖就卖什么。四年后，公司更名为“环球易购”，2011年，环球易购获深创投、红土创投合计5000万元投资。资本故事需要一个更大的出口，这个出口很快出现。

2014年，A股上市公司百圆裤业出手，以10.32亿元收购环球易购100%股权。百圆裤业靠山西人杨建新做连锁裤装起家，鼎盛时拥有上千家门店，彼时正受线下零售疲软和电商冲击，急需新的增长曲线。这笔交易附带严苛的业绩承诺：徐佳东等人承诺环球易购2014年至2017年净利润分别不低于6500万元、9100万元、1.26亿元、1.7亿元，每年的门槛都在增加。

收购完成后，百圆裤业更名跨境通，跨境电商第一股的故事正式开讲。在那一年，环球易购内部孵化出一个新的快时尚品牌，取名ZAFUL。

那是中国跨境电商独立站的黄金年代。欧美电商渗透率持续抬升，海外消费者对中国制造的接受度越来越高。国内卖家，只要把货盘搬到海外、建起一个英文网站，就能吃到不菲的红利。环球易购、兰亭集势、希音，都在这一时期完成了最初的积累。

在一众玩家中，ZAFUL选择泳装作为切口。从现在来看，这个选择正撞上风口，2014年前后，Facebook、Instagram上的网红带货模式刚刚兴起，泳装上身效果直观、视觉冲击力强，天然适合在社交平台传播。ZAFUL大规模签下海外网红，吸引18至24岁的年轻消费者。据公开报道，与其合作过的海外网红数量接近10万人。

它还把国内电商成熟的玩法整套搬到海外。除了网红开箱和穿搭测评，ZAFUL在高校里招募品牌大使，组织本地学生社群活动，赞助音乐节和时装周。它运营着自己的社区，鼓励用户晒单、分享穿搭，试图把一次性的广告流量，沉淀成可以反复触达的私域。

这些动作在当时的出海品牌里显得相当超前，也让ZAFUL的品牌声量快速逼近希音。

这套打法很快见效。ZAFUL每天保持50-100款的上新速度，从设计到上架只需一两周，用极低的价格和不断翻新的款式，把欧美年轻女性源源不断地引到自己的独立站。

数据在2018年前后达到高点。据SimilarWeb监测，2018年ZAFUL独立站月访问量达到2870万次，一度超过希音的2783万次。在当年的中国出海品牌榜单上，两个名字被市场放在一起，称作“快时尚出海双骄”。

2019年是ZAFUL的巅峰。根据跨境通2019年年报，ZAFUL注册用户达到3986.4万人，月均活跃用户约2300万人，月均访问量1.66亿次。

回看这段崛起史，ZAFUL的成功有清晰的时代逻辑。它较早意识到社交媒体的流量价值，把中国成熟的供应链和海外低成本的社交流量做了一次高效对接。

但这种成功里已经埋下了隐患。ZAFUL所做的一切，竞争对手都能做，而且只要资金更充裕、供应链更深入，就能做得更好。

月活狂跌，资金链断裂，ZAFUL被什么拖垮？

转折来得比预想更快。

2020年海外旅行、海滩度假一度停摆，泳装需求首当其冲。ZAFUL起家的品类，受冲击最重。

根据跨境通历年披露，ZAFUL的90天复购率从2019年的42%，掉到2020年上半年的12.39%，2020年底进一步降至11.96%，到2021年上半年只剩8.55%，相比巅峰缩水约八成。

流量还在，但成交的效率急转直下。2020年上半年，ZAFUL月均访问量仍有1.72亿次，甚至略高于2019年的水平，同期网站流量转化率却只有0.69%，较2019年的1.5%下降超过一半。

而同一时期，希音正在快速拉开身位。它同样主打低价、同样依赖社交媒体，却拥有更宽的品类和更快的上新能力。消费者在希音能买泳装，也能买连衣裙、休闲服、家居服，不同品类创造了更多消费场景。

更深的护城河在供应链。希音坚持小单快返，用数据捕捉潮流趋势，把成千上万的中小工厂接入系统，单款先小批量试产，卖得好再快速返单，把库存风险压到最低。而ZAFUL长期采用小单快返与买断式备货相结合的方式，资金充裕时这套打法能快速铺规模，一旦资金紧张，压在仓库里的库存就会反噬，供应链迅速僵化。

加上ZAFUL与工厂之间更多是买卖关系，买手挑款、工厂代工、贴牌上架，缺乏深度绑定，也没有数据回流。

更大的麻烦来自母公司的资金链。早在2019年第四季度，环球易购就已经出现资金周转压力。为了完成收购时的业绩承诺，环球易购多年来选择海量铺货，SKU不断扩张，靠延长账期占用供应商货款维持运转。规模越做越大，库存越压越重，现金流被一点点掏空。等流量增长失速，这套模式立刻崩塌。

2020年，跨境通归母净亏损33.74亿元，公司被实施退市风险警示。为了保住相对有竞争力的服装业务，2020年6月，深圳飒芙商业有限公司成立，承接环球易购原服装事业部的ZAFUL等独立站，试图通过拆分实现断尾求生。

但拆分没能拯救当时的ZAFUL。2021年9月，跨境通在回复问询函时承认，环球易购被申请破产后，飒芙商业信用受到影响，部分供应商要求增加信用保障，现金流压力进一步加重。

飒芙的财务数据此后一路恶化。2024年，飒芙全年营业收入仅1779.40万元，净亏损4578.18万元；截至2024年末，总资产1.39亿元，总负债8.38亿元，净资产负6.99亿元。到2025年9月末，总资产只剩7849.21万元，负债仍有8.13亿元。

2025年，其前三季度营业收入483.37万元，净亏损4212.84万元。

ZAFUL的失败，表面看是市场环境以及策略所致，底层是一个共同的问题：它始终没有把流量转化为自己的资产。

流量入口迁移，平台开始承担品牌孵化

飒芙的落幕，发生在跨境电商行业整体换挡的大背景下。

海关总署数据显示，2025年中国跨境电商进出口总值2.84万亿元，同比增长4.8%，盘子仍在扩大，增速却已从早期的两位数回落。跑马圈地的阶段过去了，行业进入精耕期。

与此同时，流量入口也在迁移。Temu用平台补贴快速起量，TikTok Shop把短视频和直播的成交逻辑带进欧美，阿里速卖通则把重心押向品牌出海。以速卖通为例，今年618大促中，速卖通品牌GMV同比增长90%，品牌成交渗透近40%，8月大促期间品牌在欧盟市场逆势增长97%。

速卖通的转身，是平台升级的样本。小米、泡泡玛特、追觅等品牌相继入驻，平台从单纯的卖货渠道，转向品牌孵化、本地履约和关税合规的基础设施。

行业用一整套调整承认了一个事实：低价能赢得第一次点击，稳定的履约和确定的体验才能把用户留住。独立站要自己扛起流量、物流、退货和关税的每一环，而平台则把这些能力打包成通用能力，再加上随着各国小额包裹免税政策收紧，真正的较量转向供应链、履约和服务。

那些活得稳健的出海企业，大多没有执着于把消费者拉进自己的网站。以赛维时代为例，2025年营收118.17亿元、归母净利润2.83亿元，亚马逊渠道占主营业务收入的80.24%，自营网站占比不到3%；安克创新把亚马逊、品牌官网和线下零售并行铺开。它们的共同点，是把精力放在产品和品牌上，渠道跟着消费者走。

ZAFUL是第一代独立站打法的缩影：靠风口起量，用投放撑规模。当流量成本抬升、关税红利消退、平台把履约和合规做成标配，这套打法的腾挪空间越来越窄。

跨境电商下半场，规模仍然重要，但利润和现金流决定一家公司能在牌桌上坐多久。

注：文/杨洁，文章来源：天下网商(公众号ID：txws_txws)，本文为作者独立观点，不代表亿邦动力立场。

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FAQ回顾

ZAFUL是什么品牌，主要面向哪些市场？

ZAFUL是跨境电商快时尚品牌，2014年由环球易购内部孵化，以泳装品类切入，面向18至24岁欧美年轻女性，通过独立站和近十万名海外网红销售。2019年其注册用户3986.4万人，月均活跃用户约2300万人，月均访问量1.66亿次，90天复购率42%。

ZAFUL为什么最终走向破产？

2020年泳装需求受疫情冲击，ZAFUL复购率从42%降至8.55%，转化率从1.5%降至0.69%；母公司环球易购资金链断裂，库存和账期压力传导；拆分后深圳飒芙信用受影响，现金流恶化。截至2025年9月，飒芙资产7849.21万元、负债8.13亿元，净资产为负7.35亿元。

跨境电商独立站的低价铺货模式为什么越来越难？

随着关税红利消退、合规门槛抬高、流量成本上升，独立站要自行承担流量、物流、退货和关税等环节；平台则将履约和合规能力打包成通用能力。低价铺货的旧模式正在加速出清，稳定盈利与现金流成为更硬的门槛，行业从跑马圈地进入精耕期。

跨境电商卖家应选择独立站还是平台渠道？

稳健出海企业并未执着于把消费者拉进自有网站，而是让渠道跟着消费者走。赛维时代2025年营收118.17亿元，亚马逊渠道占主营业务收入80.24%，自营网站占比不到3%；安克创新把亚马逊、品牌官网和线下零售并行铺开。平台可提供流量、物流、退货和关税合规等通用能力。

2025年中国跨境电商行业有哪些新趋势？

海关总署数据显示，2025年中国跨境电商进出口总值2.84万亿元，同比增长4.8%，增速从早期两位数回落，行业进入精耕期。流量入口迁移：Temu用平台补贴起量，TikTok Shop带入短视频和直播成交逻辑，速卖通押注品牌出海，平台从卖货渠道转向品牌孵化、本地履约和关税合规基础设施。

标签:: 跨境卖家泳装快时尚飒芙未来零售跨境电商

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